Intelligence, Crises and Security: Prospects and Retrospects

This collection of essays by leading experts seeks to explore what lessons for the exploitation and management of secret intelligence might be drawn from a variety of case studies ranging from the 1920s to the ?War on Terror?. Long regarded as the ?missing dimension? of international history and politics, public and academic interest in the role of secret intelligence has continued to grow in recent years, not least as a result of controversy surrounding the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11 2001. Intelligence, Crises and Security addresses a range of themes including: crisis management, covert diplomacy, intelligence tradecraft, counterterrorism, intelligence ?overload?, intelligence in relation to neutral states, deception, and signals intelligence. The work breaks new ground in relation to numerous key international episodes and events, not least as a result of fresh disclosures from government archives across the world. This book was previouslypublished as a special issue of Intelligence and National Security and will be essential reading for students of intelligence, intelligence practitioners and general readers alike.

Introduction 1. Intelligence, crises and security: Lessons from history? 2. Intelligence and diplomatic signalling during crises: The British experiences of 1877-78, 1922 and 1938 3. Crisis management in colonial states: Intelligence and counter-insurgency in Morocco and Syria after the First World War 4. 'Where the state feared to tread': Britain, Britons, covert action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-64 5. Objective intelligence or plausible denial: An open source review of intelligence method and process since 9/11 6. The CIA in Western Europe and the abuse of human rights 7. 'The importance of being honest': Switzerland, neutrality and the problems of intelligence collection and liaison 8. Overcoming strategic weakness: The Egyptian deception and the Yom Kippur War 9. The Western secret services, the East German Ministry of State Security and the building of the Berlin Wall 10. Intelligence, Iraq and the limits of legislative accountability during political crisis 11. Iraq: The Mother of all intelligence failures